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Abstract. Authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols allow two parties communicating over an insecure network to establish a common secret key. They are among the most widely used cryptographic protocols
in practice. In order to resist key-leakage attacks, several leakage resilient AKE protocols have been proposed recently in the bounded leakage model. In this paper, we initiate the study on leakage resilient AKE in
the auxiliary input model. A promising way to construct such a protocol
is to use a digital signature scheme that is entropically-unforgeable under chosen message and auxiliary input attacks. However, to date we are
not aware of any digital signature scheme that can satisfy this requirement. On the other hand, we show that in the random oracle model,
it is sufficient to use a digital signature scheme that is secure under
random message and auxiliary input attacks in order to build a secure
AKE protocol in the auxiliary input model, while the existence of such
a digital signature scheme has already been proven. We will also give a
comparison between the existing public-key encryption based and digital
signature based leakage resilient AKE protocols. We show that the latter
can provide a higher level of security than the former.
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Introduction

Leakage Resilient Cryptography. Traditional cryptographic systems always assume that the user secret keys are absolutely secure and out of the adversary’s reach. However, in recent years, various kinds of side-channel attacks
[21, 9, 22, 19] have shown that we can extract some partial information of the user
?
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secret keys stored in a computing device by observing the physical output of a
computation (e.g. running time, power consumption, radiation, etc.). In order
to defend against different types of side-channel (or more general, key leakage)
attacks, leakage resilient cryptography have become a popular research topic in
recent years.
Before constructing a leakage resilient cryptosystem, we must first build an
appropriate security model to define the information an adversary can learn in
a key leakage attack. There are several leakage models that have been defined
in the literature. In the relative leakage model [2], the leakage function h can
be any polynomial-time computable function with bounded output length. More
specifically, let k denote the size of a user secret key sk, then size of h(sk) must
be significantly smaller than k (e.g. the size of h(sk) is less than k/2). Later, in
[26], the restriction on the size of h(sk) is relaxed by requiring that the secret key
sk should still have a sufficient amount of min-entropy left after the adversary
has observed h(sk).
Another leakage model that has been extensively studied in the literature is
the bounded retrieval model (BRM) [13, 17, 3]. In BRM, the size of the leakage
can be arbitrarily large, however, users can increase their secret key size flexibly
so as to allow for a large amount of leakage. The main goal of this setting is
to ensure that increasing the size of the user secret key should not result in
significant increase in the computation or communication cost.
Recently, Dodis et al. [16, 14] defined another leakage model named the auxiliary input model. In this model, an adversary is allowed to see a computationally
hard-to-invert function (e.g. a one-way permutation) of the secret key. In other
words, the auxiliary input model has eliminated the leakage bound, and therefore
can capture a larger class of leakage functions.
Authenticated Key Exchange. Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols are mechanisms that allow two parties communicating over an insecure
network to establish a common secret key. They are a central piece for building secure communication channels. The design and analysis of AKE protocols
have been extensively studied in the last three decades for different network
settings (e.g. [6, 7, 5, 11, 1, 24, 27, 10, 29, 28]). The first formal security model for
AKE was proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [6]. The Bellare-Rogaway (or BR,
for short) model and its variants are nowadays the de facto standard for analyzing the security of an AKE protocol. In particular, the Canetti-Krawczyk
(CK) model [11], which can be considered as a combination of the BR model
and the Bellare-Canetti-Krawczyk (BCK) model [4], has been used to prove the
security of many practical AKE protocols such as the ISO protocol [20] (named
SIG-DH in [11]) and the Internet Key Exchange (or SIGMA) protocol [12, 23].
In FC’11, Yang et al. [28] extended the CK model to consider AKE under bad
randomness. Two new models were proposed in [28], one formalized the reset
attacks, and the other one formalized the bad randomness attacks. Some generic
methods for enhancing the security of existing AKE protocols (such as ISO and
SIGMA) were also proposed.
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Leakage Resilient AKE. Several leakage resilient AKE protocols have been
proposed recently. In [3], Alwen et al. extended the CK model to the bounded
retrieval setting, and showed that in BRM, a leakage resilient AKE protocol can
be constructed from an entropically-unforgeable digital signature scheme secure
under chosen-message attacks. Later, in [15], Dodis et al. showed that we can also
construct leakage resilient AKE protocols based on public-key encryption (PKE)
schemes secure in the bounded leakage model. In Sec. 4, we will review these
two constructions and give a comparison between PKE-based and signaturebased leakage resilient AKE protocols. In ASIACCS’11, based on the eCK security model proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter, and Mityagin [24], Moriyama and
Okamoto [25] presented a new bounded leakage model for AKE protocols. They
also proposed a two-pass implicitly-authenticated leakage resilient AKE protocol
and proved its security in their security model.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we initiate the study on leakage resilient
AKE in the auxiliary input model. Based on the result in [3], we can expect
that such a protocol can be built by using a digital signature scheme that is
entropically-unforgeable under chosen message and auxiliary input attacks. However, a problem arises when using this approach: to date we are not aware of
any digital signature scheme that can satisfy the requirement. Although Faust et
al. [18] have recently proposed a signature scheme that is secure under chosenmessage and auxiliary input attacks, they assume the adversary can only see
an exponentially hard-to-invert function, rather than a computationally hard-toinvert function, of the user secret key.
In this paper, we show that in the random oracle model [8], it is sufficient
to use a digital signature scheme that is secure under Random Message and
Auxiliary Input Attacks in order to build a secure AKE protocol in the auxiliary
input model, while the existence of such a digital signature scheme has recently
been proved in [18]. The key to ensure that this condition is sufficient comes
from the specific design requirement for AKE protocols: an AKE participant
not only receives but also generates random challenges in each AKE session. We
will elaborate on this in Sec. 5.
It is worth noting that we may also use public-key encryption schemes secure
in the auxiliary input model to achieve our goal. However, as we will show in
Sec. 4, in the CK-model, Signature-based AKE protocols will offer better security
than PKE-based protocols when the adversary can reveal the session state of a
party during a protocol execution.

2

Preliminaries

Notations. We only consider probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms
in this paper. In general, all the PPT algorithms have a security parameter 1k
as input, however, this input is usually omitted. We use x ← S to denote the
operation of randomly selecting x from a set S, and y ← A(x) to indicate that
y is the output of running an algorithm A on input x.

4

Guomin Yang, Yi Mu, Willy Susilo, and Duncan S. Wong

Leakage Functions. We follow the work of Dodis et al. [14] to define the class
of admissible leakage functions H with regard to a public-key cryptosystem.
We define Hpkow (`(k)) as the class of polynomial time computable functions
h : {0, 1}|pk|+|sk| → {0, 1}∗ such that given (pk, h(pk, sk)), no PPT adversary
can find sk with probability greater than `(k) ≥ 2k , where (pk, sk) denote a
random key pair generated by running the key generation algorithm of the publickey cryptosystem. In the rest of the paper, we will simply use Hpkow to denote
Hpkow (negl(k)) where negl(·) can be any negligible function.
Digital Signature. A digital signature scheme DS consists of three polynomial
time algorithms.
– DS.SKG(1k ): the key generation algorithm takes a security parameter 1k as
input and outputs a private signing key sk and a public verification key vk.
– DS.Sig(sk, m)): the signing algorithm takes a signing key sk and a message
m from the message space M as input and outputs a signature σ.
– DS.Ver(vk, m, σ)): the verification algorithm takes a verification key vk, a
message m, and a signature σ as input and outputs a bit ‘1’ or ‘0’.
Correctness. For any k ∈ N, (vk, sk) ← DS.SKG(1k ), and m ∈ M, we have
1 ← DS.Ver(vk, m, DS.Sig(sk, m)).
Unforgeability under Random Message and Auxiliary Input Attacks [18] . We say
DS satisfies Random Message Unforgeability under Random Message and Auxiliary
Input Attacks (RU-RMAA) with respect to a class of admissible leakage functions
H if for any polynomial time algorithm F, and any function h ∈ H,


(vk, sk) ← DS.SKG(1k ); m∗ ← M;
 σ ∗ ← F O(sk,·) (vk, h(vk, sk), m∗ ) : 
AdvRU-RMAA
DS,H,F (k) = Pr
DS.Ver(vk, m∗ , σ ∗ ) = 1
is negligible in k, where the oracles O(sk, ·) is defined as
Oracle O(sk, ·):

m ← M;

return (m, DS.Sig(sk, m)).

Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption: Let g denote a generator
of a cyclic group G with prime order q. The DDH assumption says for any
polynomial time algorithm D,
a b
ab
a b
r
AdvDDH
D (k) = Pr[D(g, g , g , Z) = 1|Z = g ] − Pr[D(g, g , g , Z) = 1|Z = g ]

is negligible in k where a, b, r are randomly selected from Zq .

3
3.1

Security Model and Definition
System Model

An Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol consists of two probabilistic
polynomial time algorithms: the Long-Lived Key generation algorithm SKG and
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a protocol execution algorithm P. In this paper, we focus on the public key
setting where the algorithm SKG returns a public key and the corresponding
private key upon each invocation.
Protocol Participants. Let U = {U1 , U2 , · · · , Un } denote the set of users.
Each user U ∈ U holds a public/private key pair (pkU , skU ) that is generated by
honestly executing the Long-Lived Key generation algorithm SKG. A user may
run many instances concurrently. We denote instance i of user U by ΠUi .
Protocol Execution. A protocol execution algorithm P determines how an
instance behaves in response to messages from the environment. Upon receiving
an incoming message Min , an instance executes the protocol P and generates
(Mout , dec, sidiU , pidiU , ssk, St iU ) ← P(U, pkU , skU , St iU , Min ).
The first component Mout corresponds to the responding message, and the second component dec denotes the decision of the instance. A session id sidiU and
partner id pidiU may be generated during the protocol execution. When the decision is acc, the instance holds a session key ssk which is to be used by upper
layer applications. The instance may also update its internal state St iU .
Partnership. The partnership between two instances is defined via parter ID
(pid) and session ID (sid). The pid names the party with which the instance
believes it has just exchanged a key, and the sid is an identifier which uniquely
labels the AKE session. We say two instances ΠUi and ΠVj are partners if pidiU =
V, pidjV = U and sidiU = sidjV .
3.2

Security Model

We consider an adversary A with full control over the routing and scheduling
of network messages. Our adversarial model is defined via a game between the
adversary A and a game simulator SIM. SIM first tosses a random coin b
which will be used later in the game. SIM then generates for each U ∈ U a
public/secret key pair (pkU , skU ) and gives pkU and auxiliary input hU (pkU , skU )
to A where hU ∈ Hpkow . A is allowed to make the following oracle queries to the
simulator:
– Send(U, i, m): This query allows the adversary to send a message m to
an instance ΠUi . If the message m is sent by another instance ΠUj 0 with
the intended receiver U , then this query models a passive attack. Otherwise, it models an active attack by the adversary. The simulator then
simulates the reaction of ΠUi upon receiving the message m by running
P(U, pkU , skU , St iU , m), and returns to A the response (if there is any) that
ΠUi would generate.
– Corrupt(U ): This query allows the adversary to corrupt a party U . By
making this query, the adversary learns the long-term secret key skU of user
U.
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– StateReveal(U, i): This query allows the adversary to learn the current
state information St iU held by the instance ΠUi .
– Reveal(U, i): This query allows the adversary to learn the session key that
has been generated by the instance ΠUi . If the instance ΠUi does not hold
any session key, then a special symbol ⊥ is returned to the adversary.
∗
– Test(U ∗ , i∗ ): This query can only be made to a fresh instance ΠUi ∗ (as
∗
∗
defined below). If the instance ΠUi ∗ holds a session key sskiU ∗ , then SIM
does the following
∗
• if the coin b = 1, SIM returns sskiU ∗ to the adversary;
• otherwise, a random session key is drawn from the session key space and
returned to the adversary.
Otherwise, a special symbol ⊥ is returned to the adversary.
SK-security without PFS. We define session key security without perfect
forward secrecy as follows.
We say an instance ΠUi is fresh if
– A has never made a Corrupt query to U or pidiU ; and
– A has never made a Reveal query to ΠUi or its partner; and
– A has never made a StateReveal query to ΠUi or its partner.
At the end of the game, the adversary outputs a bit b0 as her guess for b. The
adversary’s advantage in winning the game is defined as
0
AdvAKE
A (k) = |2Pr[b = b] − 1|.

Definition 1. We say an AKE protocol is SK-Secure without perfect forward
secrecy in the auxiliary input model if the following conditions hold.
1. If two uncorrupted parties complete matching sessions then they both output
the same key.
2. For any PPT adversary A, and any {hU ∈ Hpkow }U ∈U , AdvAKE
A (k) is a
negligible function of k.
SK-security with PFS. In order to define perfect forward secrecy, we follow
the approach of Canetti and Krawczyk [11] by introducing a new type of oracle
query
– Expire(U, i): Upon receiving this query, the simulator erases all the state
information St iU and the session key sskiU held by the instance ΠUi .
The freshness of an instance ΠUi is now redefined as follows:
–
–
–
–

A makes a Corrupt(U ) query only after an Expire(U, i) query; and
A has never made a Reveal query to ΠUi ; and
A has never made a StateReveal query to ΠUi ; and
if ΠUi has a partner instance ΠVj , then A also obeys the above rules with
respect to ΠVj ; otherwise, A has never made a Corrupt(pidiU ) query.
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Defined the adversary’s advantage in winning the PFS game as
AdvAKE-PFS
(k) = |2Pr[b0 = b] − 1|.
A
Definition 2. We say an AKE protocol is SK-Secure with perfect forward secrecy in the auxiliary input model if the following conditions hold.
1. If two uncorrupted parties complete matching sessions then they both output
the same key.
2. For any PPT adversary A, and any {hU ∈ Hpkow }U ∈U , AdvAKE-PFS
(k) is
A
negligible in k.

4

SIG-DH vs PKE-DH

Several leakage resilient AKE protocols [3, 15, 25] have been proposed recently
in the bounded leakage/retrieval model. In this section, we briefly review the
Signature-based Diffie-Hellman protocol (eSIG-DH) [3] and the PKE-based DiffieHellman protocol (Enc-DH) [15], and give a comparison between them.

A
(vkA , skA ) ← DS.SKG(1k )

B
(vkB , skB ) ← DS.SKG(1k )

x ← Zq , α ← g x

A, α

B, β, σB

y ← Zq , β ← g y , sid ← αkβ
σB ← DS.Sig(skB , A, B, α, β)



sid ← αkβ
σA ← DS.Sig(skA , B, A, α, β)
ssk ← g xy
erase x

A, σA

-

ssk ← g xy
erase y

Fig. 1. The eSIG-DH Protocol [3].

The eSIG-DH protocol [3] is presented in Fig. 1. It is an extension of the
SIG-DH protocol [11] in the bounded retrieval setting. The protocol makes use of
a digital signature scheme DS that is entropically-unforgeable under chosen message attacks in the bounded retrieval model to achieve mutual authentication. In
contrast, the Enc-DH protocol [15] (Fig. 2) is based on a leakage resilient PKE
scheme supporting labels. The idea behind Enc-DH is that only the real user
who has the decryption key can decrypt a ciphertext and answer the challenge.
Deniable Authentication. As pointed out by Dodis et al. in [15], due to the nonrepudiation property of the digital signatures, it is obvious that the eSIG-DH
protocol cannot provide the feature of deniable authentication. On the other
hand, the Enc-DH protocol can achieve such a property, since the messages generated by user A in fact can be simulated by user B, and vice versa.
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A
(pkA , skA ) ← PKE.SKG(1k )

B
(pkB , skB ) ← PKE.SKG(1k )

x ← Zq , α ← g x
CA ← PKE.EncA (pkB , α)

A, CA

y ← Zq , β ← g y
α ← PKE.DecA (skB , CA )
CB ← PKE.EncA,B (pkA , α, β)

A, B, CB


(α, β) ← PKE.DecA,B (skA , CB )
sid ← αkβ, ssk ← g xy
erase x

A, β

-

sid ← αkβ, ssk ← g xy
erase y

Fig. 2. The Enc-DH Protocol [15].

Security under StateReveal Query. There is actually another big difference
between the eSIG-DH and Enc-DH protocols: if we consider the full CK model
where the adversary is able to make StateReveal queries, then an adversary
can launch the following attack against the Enc-DH protocol:
1. The adversary activates an instance of A to start a new AKE session with
B, and faithfully delivers the first message (A, CA ) to B.
2. Upon receiving the response (A, B, CB ) from B, the adversary makes a
StateReveal query to B and obtains0 α.
0
3. The adversary then generates β 0 = g y and CB
← PKE.EncA,B (pkA , α, β 0 ),
0
and sends (A, B, CB ) to user A.
4. User A would accept the session, send the third message (A, β 0 ), and output
0
the session key sskA = g xy .
Since the adversary knows the value of y 0 , she can derive the session key and
win the game. It is worth noting that in the above attack, the instance of user
A does not have a partner, but it is still fresh according to the definition. In
other words, the adversary can successfully break the authentication mechanism
employed under the Enc-DH protocol if she can make StateReveal queries.
On the other hand, it is easy to check that such a problem does not exist in the
eSIG-DH protocol.

5

A Leakage Resilient AKE Protocol Secure in The
Auxiliary Input Model

In this section, we present a leakage resilient AKE protocol that is secure in
the auxiliary input model. The scheme is based on a signature scheme that is
random message unforgeable under random message and auxiliary input attacks
(RU-RMAA) [18].
5.1

The aSIG-DH AKE Protocol

The only difference between our new protocol and the eSIG-DH protocol (Fig. 1)
resides in the computation of the digital signatures. In the eSIG-DH protocol
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[3], an entropically-unforgeable signature scheme secure in the bounded-retrieval
model is used, while in the aSIG-DH protocol, each party will first compute a
hash digest of the message, and then sign the hash digest using an RU-RMAA
secure digital signature scheme [18]. Another important remark we should make
is that same as the SIG-DH [11] and eSIG-DH [3] protocols, we assume that the
signing operation is an atomic operation done by an independent module.
Why RU-RMAA Security is Sufficient. Readers may wonder that given an RURMAA secure digital signature scheme DS = (SKG, Sig, Ver), if we first hash
the message M and then sign the hash digest H(M ) using DS.Sig, will we obtain an entropically-unforgeable signature scheme secure under chosen message
attacks in the random oracle model (i.e. H is modelled as a random oracle)? Unfortunately, in general the answer is No! Consider that DS.Sig is a randomized
algorithm, then in a chosen message attack, when the adversary makes two signing queries with the same message m, two distinct yet valid signatures should be
returned to the adversary. However, such signing queries cannot be answered by
using the signing oracle defined in the RU-RMAA security game. Fortunately,
in an AKE protocol, each participant will generate a fresh challenge in an AKE
session. To impersonate a participant A without knowing A’s signing key, the
adversary needs to forge a valid signature on the fresh challenge sent by B. On
the other hand, to answer the Send queries made by the adversary to the participant A, the simulator can make use of the signing oracle in the RU-RMAA
security game since the signed message will also contain a fresh challenge generated by A (i.e. a message to be signed by A would not appear in two different
sessions).

A
(vkA , skA ) ← DS.SKG(1k )

B
(vkB , skB ) ← DS.SKG(1k )

x ← Zq , α ← g x

A, α

B, β, σB

y ← Zq , β ← g y , sid ← αkβ

σB ← DS.Sig(skB , H(A, B, α, β))



sid ← αkβ
σA ← DS.Sig(skA , H(B, A, α, β))
ssk ← g xy
erase x

A, σA

-

ssk ← g xy
erase y

Fig. 3. The aSIG-DH Protocol.

Theorem 1. The aSIG-DH protocol is SK-secure with perfect forward secrecy
in the auxiliary input model if the digital signature scheme DS is RU-RMAA
secure w.r.t. Hpkow , the DDH assumption holds in group G, and H is a random
oracle.
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Proof. The first condition in the definition of SK-security is easy to see. Below we
prove that the aSIG-DH protocol also satisfies the second condition. We define a
sequence of games Gi (i ≥ 0) where G0 is the original game defined in our security
model with PFS. We also define Advi as the advantage of the adversary in game
Gi (i.e. Adv0 = AdvAKE-PFS
(k)).
A
Game G1 . Let forge denote the event that A successfully forges a valid signature
of a user U (i.e. an instance ΠVj receives a message/signature pair ((V, U, α, β), σU )
in a Send query such that DS.Ver(pkU , (V, U, α, β), σU ) = 1 and there is no instance of U which has sent a valid signature on (V, U, α, β) to the A) before
corrupting U . If a forge event happens, then the simulator aborts the game and
outputs a random bit b0 . Then we have
Pr[b0 = b in G0 |¬forge] = Pr[b0 = b in G1 |¬forge]
and
Pr[b0 = b in G0 ] − Pr[b0 = b in G1 ] ≤ Pr[forge].
Therefore, we have
Adv0 ≤ Adv1 + 2Pr[forge].
In the following, we show that the event forge happens only with a negligible
probability.
Claim. The event forge happens only with a negligible probability if DS is
RU-RMAA secure with respect to Hpkow and H is a random oracle.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A and a set of leakage functions S =
{h1 , h2 , · · · , hn } ⊂ Hpkow w.r.t. the set of users U = {U1 , U2 , · · · , Un } such that
a forge event would occur with a non-negligible probability, we show that there
exists another algorithm F and a leakage function h ∈ Hpkow such that F can
win the RU-RMAA security game also with a non-negligible probability.
Let h∗ denote a leakage function randomly selected from S, and F is given a
challenge (vk ∗ , h∗ (vk ∗ , sk ∗ ), m∗ ) as input where (vk ∗ , sk ∗ ) ← DS.SKG(1k ) and
m∗ is randomly selected from the message space M of DS. Wlog, assume h∗ is
the i-th function in the set S (i.e. h∗ = hi ). F then sets the challenge public key
vk ∗ as the public key of the user Ui . F then generates the long-term keys for
all the remaining users in U by running DS.SKG(1k ). In addition, F randomly
selects ζ ← [1, qH ] where qH denotes the number of hash queries A would make
in the game. F then passes {vkj , hj (vkj , skj )}(1 ≤ j ≤ n) to A and answers A’s
oracle queries as follows.
F answers A’s hash oracle queries as follows: when A submits a hash query, F
first checks if the same input has been queried before. If yes, then the same output
is returned to A. Otherwise, F checks if the input has the format (·, Ui , · · · ). If
not, a random element in M is selected and returned to A; otherwise, F issues
a signing query to its signing oracle to obtain (m, σ), and sets m as the hash
value of (·, Ui , · · · ). When A makes the ζ-th hash query, F sets m∗ as the hash
value and returns m∗ to A.
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When A makes a Send query to an instance of Ui , if a signature of Ui on
the hash value of (Uj , Ui , α, β) is required in order to answer this query, F first
checks if a signature σ corresponding to H(Uj , Ui , α, β) has been obtained from
its signing oracle before. If yes, σ is returned to A. Otherwise, F first makes a
signing query to obtain (m, σ), then sets m as the hash value of (Uj , Ui , α, β)
and uses σ as the corresponding signature to answer the Send query. Since each
instance of Ui will generate a fresh Diffie-Hellman component (either α or β),
with overwhelming probability, (Uj , Ui , α, β) would never repeat in difference
instances of Ui .
F simulates other operations performed by each instance honestly, and answers all the Reveal and StateReveal queries as usual. If A makes a Corrupt
(Ui ) query during the game, F aborts the game and outputs nothing.
If A successfully forges a signature σ ∗ of Ui on the hash value m∗ , then F
outputs σ ∗ and halts. Otherwise, F outputs nothing and halts when A halts.
Since Ui and ζ are randomly selected, it is clear that
AdvRU-RMAA
DS,Hpkow ,F (k) =

1
Pr[forge].
n · qH

Hence, we have
Adv0 ≤ Adv1 + 2nqH AdvRU-RMAA
DS,Hpkow ,F (k).
Game G2 . In game G2 , we change game G1 as follows: the simulator randomly
∗
chooses an instance (say the i-th instance) ΠUi ∗ among all the instances created
∗
in the game, if the Test query is not performed on ΠUi ∗ , the simulator aborts
and outputs a random bit b0 . Let nI denote the number of instances created in
the game, then we have
Pr[b0 = b] = Pr[b0 = b|Test(U ∗ , i∗ )]Pr[Test(U ∗ , i∗ )]
+Pr[b0 = b|¬Test(U ∗ , i∗ )]Pr[¬Test(U ∗ , i∗ )]
1
1
1
= Pr[b0 = b in G1 ]
+ (1 −
)
nI
2
nI
1
1
1
= +
(Pr[b0 = b in G1 ] − )
2 nI
2
and
Adv1 = nI Adv2 .
Game G3 . In game G3 , we change game G2 by replacing the Diffie-Hellman key
∗ ∗
g x y in the test session with a random element g r ∈ G. Below we show that if
the adversary’s advantage changes significantly in game G3 , we can construct a
distinguisher B to break the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption.
B is given a challenge (g a , g b , Z), in which with equal probability, Z is either
ab
g or a random element of G. B simulates game G2 honestly by generating all
the long-term secret keys for all the users. When simulating the i-th instance
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∗

∗

∗

ΠUi ∗ and its partner, A sets g x = g a , g y = g b and Z as the corresponding
session key. Finally, if A wins the game, B outputs
1, otherwise,
B outputs 0.
∗
∗
Since a forge event would not happen on pidiU ∗ before pidiU ∗ is corrupted, we
∗
can guarantee that a partner instance of ΠUi ∗ must exist. So the Diffie-Hellman
components in the test session must be g a and g b . If Z = g ab , then A is in game
G2 ; otherwise, if Z is a random element of G, then A is in game G3 . Therefore
we have
AdvDDH
(k) = Pr[B outputs 1|Z = g ab ] − Pr[B outputs 1|Z = g r ]
B
= Pr[A wins the game|Z = g ab ] − Pr[A wins the game|Z = g r ]
1
= (Adv2 − Adv3 )
2
and
(k).
Adv2 ≤ Adv3 + 2AdvDDH
B
It is clear that the adversary A has no advantage than random guess in game
G3 (i.e. Adv3 = 0). Hence, we have
AdvAKE-PFS
(k) ≤ 2nI AdvDDH
(k) + 2nqH AdvRU-RMAA
A
B
DS,Hpkow ,F (k).


6

Conclusion

In this paper, we initiated the study on leakage resilient authenticated key exchange in the auxiliary input model. We showed that in the random oracle model,
we can build an AKE protocol secure under auxiliary input attacks based on a
digital signature scheme that is random message unforgeable under random message and auxiliary input attacks (RU-RMAA). We also showed the differences
between signature-based and public-key encryption-based Diffie-Hellman protocols and concluded that signatured-based protocols can offer a higher level of
security than encryption-based ones when the adversary is allowed to learn the
state information of a protocol participant. We leave the construction of a secure
AKE against auxiliary input attacks without random oracles as our future work.
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